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life in transition on
the Thailand-Burma
Border
by Edith Bowles
The Karen, Mon and Karenni refugee camps
along Thailand’s border with Burma have
traditionally been small, open settlements
where the refugee communities have been
able to maintain a village atmosphere, admin-
istering the camps and many aspects of assistance
programmes themselves. Much of this, 
however, is changing. 
11 FORCED MIGRATION review August 1998,   2
people in camps feature
S
ince 1995, the 110,000 ethnic
minority refugees from Burma have
faced new security threats and
greater regulation by the Royal Thai
Government (RTG). An increasing num-
ber of the refugees now live in larger,
more crowded camps and are more
dependent on assistance than ever
before. At the beginning of 1994, 72,000
refugees lived in 30 camps, of which the
largest housed 8,000 people; by mid
1998, 110,000 refugees lived in 19
camps, with the largest housing over
30,000 people. 
Background
Burma is home to one of the longest
running civil wars in the world. Over the
last 50 years, opposition organisations
representing a variety of political agen-
das have taken up arms against the cen-
tral government in Rangoon. Since 1962,
the country has been run by a succes-
sion of military governments, including
the current ruling junta, the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC). The
primary victims in Burma’s protracted
civil war have been ethnic minority people,
like the Karen, Mon and Karenni, in
Burma’s rural areas. Although since
1989 most of the armed opposition
groups have entered into cease-fire
agreements with the Burmese govern-
ment, there is still fighting along the
Thailand-Burma border. 
The Burmese government has one of the
worst human rights records in the
world. People flee to the refugee camps
in Thailand from forced labour, forced
relocations and military offensives. Each
dry season (October-May) the Burmese
military launches an offensive against
the opposition armies, often displacing
large numbers of refugees into Thailand.
The military offensives are associated
with widespread abuse of civilians,
including summary execution, torture
and rape, as well as looting and destruc-
tion of property. The Burmese army has
also carried out massive forced reloca-
tions of rural villages, with the intention
of eliminating civilian support for oppo-
sition groups or clearing ground for
infrastructure projects. Furthermore, in
the dry season, villagers are routinely
forced to work without pay on building
roads, railways, irrigation ditches and
other infrastructure projects. 
with international human rights stan-
dards, providing support to independent
national human rights institutions and
strengthening civil society and NGOs. 
Human rights field officers play an inte-
gral role in the establishment of confi-
dence necessary for voluntary return of
displaced populations and act as a
deterrent to human rights abuses. They
should be sufficiently deployed in areas
with large concentrations of IDPs and
should make available information rela-
tive to the situation of IDPs and analy-
ses of trends to, inter alia, host
governments and the Representative of
the Secretary-General on IDPs. Future
human rights operations could include
in their mission agreements specific
provisions allowing access of human
rights personnel to internally displaced
populations, and should make reference
to the Guiding Principles.
In line with the Secretary-General’s
‘Programme for Reform’ which identi-
fied human rights as an issue which
cuts across all areas of United Nations
activities and set as a major task for the
Organisation to fully integrate human
rights in its broad range of activities, 
UN staff must be better trained in
human rights norms and IDP concerns.
This would allow them to raise protection
issues on behalf of IDPs and to better
integrate protection concerns with the
provision of relief. Such training would
also facilitate the development of common
UN approaches in response to serious vio-
lations of human rights and humanitarian
law that could lead to internal displacement.
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt has
worked in the field in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Rwanda and Albania,
and currently works for the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights. The views expressed in this 
article are purely personal. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the
Kibeho crisis, see Kleine-Ahlbrandt S
The Protection Gap in the International
Protection of Internally Displaced
Persons: the case of Rwanda, Geneva,
Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes
Internationales, 1996, 172pp. 
1 Adelman H and Suhrke A, Early Warning and
Conflict Management, Study II of the DANIDA Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The
International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, March 1996,  
p 94.  
2  In-Country Report, United Nations Rwanda
Emergency Office, 9 February 1995.
3 See Cohen R and Deng F The Forsaken People:
Case Studies of the Internally Displaced and Masses
in Flight, pp 172-174: see pp 37 of this FMR for
details.The camps
The first Karen camp was established in
1984, not far from the border town of
Mae Sot in Thailand’s Tak Province. By
1986, there were 12 Karen refugee
camps with a collective population of
18,000 people in Tak and Mae Hong Son
provinces. The first Karenni camp was
established in Mae Hong Son province in
1989. Mon refugees came to Thailand in
1990, after the Mon and Karen opposi-
tion bases at Three Pagodas Pass were
overrun by the Burmese army. 
The border is over 2,000 km long, with
thousands of potential crossing points.
New camps have often been established
close to wherever large groups of new
refugees crossed, frequently in the wake
of military offensives. Individual families
and smaller groups arriving in Thailand
separately have gone to established
camps. While some camps are located on
main roads and near Thai villages, many
are in remote areas. The terrain along
the border is mountainous and heavily
forested in places.  
The camps, particularly the smaller
ones, have traditionally had a village-like
atmosphere. Planned by the refugee
communities, the layout of camps varies
a good deal. In some camps, houses are
built in rows facing a main road through
the centre of the camp. In others, houses
are built in clusters around a network of
paths. Larger camps are sub-divided into
sections but there are no barriers
between sections. Communal buildings,
like hospitals and schools, are located in
the middle of the camp or, in the case of
large camps with more than one school,
in the middle of sections. Most children
need to walk for no more than 10 min-
utes to school.  Queuing for water is rare
as the water supply is generally ade-
quate and accessible,
with water tanks or
wells at frequent inter-
vals. Most camps are
located near streams,
which are used for
bathing and washing
clothes. In some camps
there is space for peo-
ple to plant small veg-
etable gardens or even
to rear animals next to
their homes, although
these activities vary depending on the
quality of the soil and how strictly an
RTG ban on refugee crop planting is
enforced.
The size, location and openness of the
camps allowed the refugees to gather
building materials, firewood and food
from the surrounding forests. House
walls and floors are constructed out of
split bamboo and roofs out of leaf
thatch. (According to RTG regulations,
no permanent buildings are allowed to
be built.) Refugees gather edible forest
vegetables, such as bamboo shoots, wild
beans and leaves, to supplement their
diets; they can also earn cash by selling
forest vegetables, leaf thatch or charcoal. 
Although RTG regulations technically
forbid refugees to engage in economic
activities, some refugees have been able
to find work as daily labourers on nearby
Thai farms or forest plantations. Other
economic activities include weaving,
cooking food for sale, or running small
shops. Most camps have at least a few
small shops, located along the main
road or scattered among the houses, and
larger camps maintain significant markets.
Camp administration
As each new refugee group came across
the border, they established refugee
committees, with offices in the nearest
Thai towns, to seek and coordinate relief
assistance. The camps are administered
by camp committees with a camp leader
and section leaders drawn from the
camp community. The school head
teacher and/or representatives of the
women’s or youth organisations may
also serve on the committee. These com-
mittees are responsible for all aspects of
camp administration, including the reg-
istration of the population in new camps
or recording births, deaths, and new
arrivals in established camps, mainte-
nance and sanitation, resolution of dis-
putes, transport and referral of medical
emergencies, and camp security.
Ultimately, the responsibility for
accountability and transparency in aid
distribution, particularly food aid, also
rests with them. Camp administrative
systems maintained by the refugee com-
munities themselves, rather than
imposed by the Thai authorities or
relief agencies, have been integral to
refugee autonomy and self-sufficiency.
Assistance
The original RTG mandate for NGO
assistance covered only food, medi-
cines, clothing and other essential
items. A mandate for educational
assistance was added at the end of
1996. The RTG has always insisted
that NGO activities remain low-profile
and that there be no permanent expa-
triate presence in the camps. The
NGOs operating along the border
have also sought to create non-intru-
sive programmes, promote refugee
self-sufficiency and minimise aid
dependency. Assistance to the camps
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Karenni camp, Mae Hong Son province
Camp administrative systems
maintained by the refugee 
communities themselves…
have been integral to refugee 
autonomy and self-sufficiency.
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people in camps featureis sent through the refugee committees
which, in conjunction with the camp
committees, oversee the distribution of
supplies. Recognising the ability of the
refugees to maximise their resources,
whether from forest products, garden
plots or income-generating opportuni-
ties, assistance originally included only
rice, salt, fish paste, mosquito nets and
blankets, with sleeping mats and cook-
ing pots provided to new arrivals as
needed. Yellow beans have also been
provided where there is a large number
of new arrivals or a demonstrated nutri-
tional need for them, such as in a camp
where soil or weather conditions are so
poor that kitchen gardens are untenable.
The system of assistance delivery works
on trust and cooperation between the
refugee populations and aid agencies.
There are no outside enumeration sys-
tems, such as counting heads or marking
people with paint, during registrations
or food distribution. 
An unusual aspect of the situation is
that UNHCR has played no role in assis-
tance or, until recently, protection. The
RTG has always maintained that the peo-
ple in camps on the Thailand-Burma
border are not ‘refugees’ but ‘displaced
persons’, to whom the RTG is offering
‘temporary shelter’. As Thailand is not a
signatory to the United Nations 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees,
UNHCR cannot officially recognise the
refugees without invitation from the
RTG, which the RTG has consistently
refused to grant. 
Advantages
For many years, the system of small,
open camps spread out over hundreds
of kilometres, many of them located in
under-populated areas, had advantages
for all parties and particularly for the
refugees. Refugees could use water and
forest products without placing a strain
on local resources, at the same time
maintaining their traditional foraging,
cultivation and building skills, without
needing to rely entirely on NGO assis-
tance. Furthermore, the small size of the
camps and the style of administration -
with committee members chosen entirely
from the refugee community - allowed
each group to maintain their cultural tra-
ditions and social structure, despite dis-
placement. 
Overall, the camps provided a context
where families were in part self-suffi-
cient, the majority of children attended
primary school, there were few social
problems or conflicts, malnutrition was
rare, and the communities could live
according to their own traditions. Health
was, on the whole, good, and community
morale and pride were tangible: families
planted flowers around their well-main-
tained houses, and ceremonies in
schools, churches and monasteries were
carefully planned and well-attended.  
The establishment of small, unobtrusive
camps also suited the RTG in the early
years. In many areas, people on both
sides of the border belong to the same 
ethnic group.
Consequently the
refugees were not
only inconspicu-
ous but attracted
some local sym-
pathy. More
importantly, the
refugees and the
ethnic minority
opposition along
the border
formed a conve-
nient buffer
between the Thai
and Burmese
armies. For NGOs,
the organisation
and comparative
self-sufficiency of
the refugees
allowed for an
extremely cost-
effective pro-
gramme. Until
1994, the food
relief programme for the whole border
was handled by two expatriate field
staff. 
Camp consolidations, 
restrictions and ‘temporary sites’
Since 1995, however, there has been a
transition from small, open camps with
high levels of refugee self-sufficiency to
larger, closed camps and greater aid
dependency, particularly in the Karen
camps. The change is due in part to the
drastic deterioration in security in the
Karen camps. 
Until 1995, de facto protection for the
refugee camps was provided by the eth-
nic minority opposition armies based
along the Burma side of the border.
However, between 1995 and 1997,
almost all the opposition-held territory
along the border was captured by the
Burmese army, leaving camps vulnerable
to attack. More importantly, the
Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army
(DKBA), a splinter group from Karen
National Union (KNU), formerly one of
the largest opposition groups in Burma,
has carried out dozens of attacks on
refugee camps. Backed by the Burmese
army, the DKBA appears intent on
destroying the KNU and driving the
Karen refugees back to Burma. Dozens
of refugees and Thai villagers have been
killed or kidnapped, five camps have
been completely burned down, and 
millions of Baht in cash or property
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‘Temporary site’, Kanchanaburi province
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people in camps featurebelonging to refugees or Thai villagers
have been stolen. With the emergence of
the DKBA, protection has become the
most important issue for the Karen
refugees.
The RTG has responded to the DKBA
incursions in a number of ways. Arguing
that a few large camps are more easily
defended than many small camps, the
RTG has developed and partially carried
out a policy of camp consolidation. In
1995, seven Karen camps were combined
into two, then consolidated again in
early 1998 into Mae La camp, with a
population of some 30,800. In 1997,
nine other camps were combined to
form three camps of between 8,000 and
10,000 people each. In early 1998,
another seven, relatively small Karen
camps were consolidated into three
camps with populations ranging from
4,000 to 7,000. In December 1993,
55,000 Karen refugees lived in 19
camps; by 1998, approximately 90,000
Karen refugees lived in 12 camps, seven
of which had over 6,000 residents. It is
possible that eventually all the Karen
camps will be consolidated into a few
large camps, although in some areas the
consolidations have faced stiff refugee
resistance. Additionally, the RTG has
deployed Thai militia in the camps. In
1997, fences were erected around six of
the largest Karen camps, including Mae
La, and strict controls placed on the
movement of people in and out.
Furthermore, it is likely that the RTG will
allow UNHCR to set up a number of per-
manent offices on the border.
While the new restrictions may serve to
protect the refugees, they have also
severely cut into refugee livelihoods and
self-sufficiency. No longer able to go out
of the camps to forage in the forest or
earn a cash income, and living in camps
too crowded for gardens or livestock,
many Karen refugees are now more
dependent on NGO assistance. Where
refugees are not allowed to cut bamboo
or gather firewood, NGOs have had to
provide building materials, cooking fuel
and supplementary food, such as yellow
beans and cooking oil, in addition to the
regular rations. The moves themselves
cause insecurity as refugees lose access
to their gardens and opportunities to
forage, while having to expend more
energy in moving and re-building. 
Other new restrictions seem to be aimed
at further lowering living standards in
the camps and/or deterring new
refugees. For example, Tham Hin (8,000
residents) and Ban Don Yang (1,500),
both established in 1997 in
Kanchanaburi provinces, have been des-
ignated ‘temporary shelters’. Almost one
year after the camps were set up,
refugees have still not been allowed to
build houses but only bamboo platforms
with a roof of plastic sheeting - insuffi-
cient protection in both dry and rainy
seasons. Queues for water are much
longer than in other camps, space is con-
sidered inadequate, and overall condi-
tions are far worse than in other camps
on the border. The camps are completely
closed: refugees are not allowed to go
out of the camps and access is strictly
limited. In older camps the once flour-
ishing markets have been drastically
scaled back; no ‘luxury’ can be sold, only
small, inexpensive items.
The new restrictions and controls, while
carried out in the name of refugee pro-
tection or creation of ‘temporary’ camps,
also give the RTG more direct control
over the refugee communities. Some fear
that these measures may be aimed at
facilitating an eventual repatriation. An
obvious solution to the problems posed
by the DKBA would have been to relo-
cate the camps further inside Thailand,
well away from the border. However, this
solution was unacceptable to the RTG
which  feared that it would encourage
the refugees to feel more settled in
Thailand, rendering any repatriation
effort logistically, and politically, more
problematic. Finally, the consolidations
reduce the number of refugees living in
the camps. With each camp move, some
refugees have dispersed into forested
areas, gone into Thai towns, or even
made their way back to Burma. As a
result, the official caseload has shrunk
while the number of refugees without
protection and assistance has grown.
As economic cooperation between the
RTG and the Burmese government has
grown, the Burmese opposition groups
and refugees along the border have gone
from being a convenient buffer for
Thailand to an increasingly intolerable
embarrassment to both countries. On
one occasion during the 1997 dry season
offensive, several hundred Karen men
and boys were refouled by the Thai
army into an area of active conflict.
Since then, some other groups of new
arrivals have also not been allowed to
cross the border or enter camps, but have
had to stay in the forest or in ad hoc
camp sites. The RTG has made it plain
that it would like to see the refugees repa-
triated as quickly as possible, leading to
fears that the refugees may be coerced
into repatriation before there is any solu-
tion to Burma’s ongoing political crises.
Conclusion
In addition to creating new needs and
deterring asylum seekers, the drastic
changes, particularly in the Karen
refugee camps, have had other, less 
tangible, social effects. The refugee and
camp committees were able to manage
the camps and maintain low levels of
social conflict because the camps were
small and disagreements could be
resolved within the community itself.
With the establishment of larger camps,
social problems have become more sig-
nificant. While increased rations can
address food insecurity, there is also a
clear loss of morale. Tensions rise as
soon as there are rumours of impending
camp moves. People stop tending flower
beds and crops or repairing their homes
when they learn they have to move. The
education of children is disrupted, lead-
ing to higher drop-out and failure rates.
The cultural and administrative auton-
omy, self-sufficiency and village atmos-
phere which had previously been integral
to life in the camps are rapidly being lost.
Edith Bowles is currently a consul-
tant at Pathfinder International in
Boston, USA. As Burma Project
Officer for the Jesuit Refugee
Service from 1993 to 1996, she
worked on food aid, education, and
information/advocacy programmes in
refugee camps along the Thailand-
Burma border. 
1 The military government changed the official name
from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 As ‘Myanmar’ is
therefore associated with the military government, 
it is not accepted or used by development or human
rights organisations, or by Burmese opponents of the
regime. 
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…the official caseload has shrunk while the
number of refugees without protection and
assistance has grown.